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ABSTRACT 
E-marketplaces are implementing various policies to reduce the information asymmetry between sellers and buyers. One 
popular way is to issue different kinds of certificates (or seals) for sellers, e.g., a quality certificate for sellers who have a lower 
product return rate than others or a quick certificate for sellers who dispatch products faster than others. Despite a plethora of 
previous studies on the role of certificates in the e-marketplace, we have a limited understanding of certificate effects in the 
post-order stage, where buyers can reverse their purchase decision. Based on the psychological contract violation theory and 
other related literature, we first explain why seller certificates can take a role in buyers’ order cancellation decision. Then, we 
empirically examine the effects of seller certificates using the large transaction data from a leading e-marketplace in Korea. 
Our findings are as follows. Given the time elapsed from the order, buyers are less likely to cancel the order when the seller 
has a quality certificate (for sellers who have lower product return rate than others) or a quantity certificate (for experienced 
sellers who sold a larger amount of products than others). When the seller has a quick certificate (for sellers who dispatch 
products faster than others), on the other hand, buyers are more likely to cancel the order. Further, the effects of seller 
certificates on order cancellation are largely varying across purchase channels (Smartphone vs. PC) and product types 
(convenience goods, shopping goods, vs. specialty goods). 
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INTRODUCTION 
E-marketplaces are implementing various policies to reduce the information asymmetry between sellers and buyers. One 
popular way is to issue different kinds of certificates (or seals) for sellers, e.g., a quality certificate for sellers who have a lower 
product return rate than others or a quick certificate for sellers who dispatch products faster than others [2]. 
  
Previous studies show that the presence of those certificates works as a positive signal for buyers to choose among sellers and 
make an order. The certificates can decrease buyers’ perceived risk on transactions [7] and help to develop their trust on sellers 
[5], resulting in increasing their willingness to pay for goods and services [3]. By signaling sellers’ quality, the certificates can 
promote more online transactions and benefit the entire e-marketplace [10].  
 
While a plethora of previous studies focused on the positive role of certificates in the e-marketplace, they are more or less 
limited to investigating the role of certificates in buyers’ selection decision among different sellers. Little is known about how 
the certificates work in the post-order stage where buyers can reverse their decision and cancel the order. As the presence of 
certificates can increase buyer’s expectation on sellers’ quality, having the certificates can enhance the choice probability for 
sellers. However, the expectation-confirmation theory suggests that the increased expectation, at the same time, might 
aggravate the risk of disconfirmation of buyers’ beliefs [9] and trigger more psychological contract violation to buyers [11]. 
That is, when buyers receive a poor product and service, they are more likely to be disappointed with it and take negative 
actions such as cancelling the order or returning the product, if it is from sellers with certificates, as their expectation for those 
sellers is higher.  
 
Furthermore, previous studies tell little about the differential values of certificates across product categories and purchase 
channels. The role of certificates, which reduces the information asymmetry between buyers and sellers, can depend on the 
product category, as the amount of information that a buyer needs vary across product categories [8]. We have a limited 
understanding of category-level effects of certificates because the results of previous studies are based on either a single 
product category [10] or the aggregated categories [3, 6, 7, 12]. Further, previous studies provide little guidance on how the 
certificates work in the mobile commerce channel. They focused the role of certificates in the traditional e-commerce where 
the PC is the medium for buyers to collect product information. Little is known about how the certificates work in the mobile 
channel, which became popular but has unique characteristics differentiated from the traditional PC channel [1]. 
 
To fill this gap and expand our knowledge on the role of certificates in the e-marketplace, we empirically investigate the effects 
of seller certificates on buyers’ order cancellation behavior using the large transaction data from the database of a leading 
e-marketplace in Korea. Specifically, we focused on the role of three different types of certificates, a quality certificate (for 
sellers who have lower product return rate than others), a quantity certificate (for experienced sellers who sold a larger amount 
of products than others), and a quick certificate (for sellers who dispatch products faster than others). We also examine the 
differential effects of certificates across product categories and purchase channels (PC vs. Mobile Phone).  
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DATA AND ANALYSIS RESULTS 
We obtained the data from the leading e-marketplace in Korea. The dataset contains the entire transactions of 60,000 buyers for 
more than two years (March 2009–June 2011), in which there are around 2.5 million order records and 11.5 thousand 
cancellation records. Our dataset also contains the information about purchase channels (PC and Mobile), which allows us to 
examine the different effect of certificates on order cancellation between purchase channels. Table 1 shows the descriptive 
statistics on the number of orders and cancellations with each certificate and the average time to cancellation after payment. 
 
Cancellations vary in terms of elapsed time after orders. Further, all orders do not end up to cancellations, which poses the 
issue of censoring. Considering the different cancellation time and the censoring issue, we employed a Cox proportional hazard 
(PH) model. Table 2 shows our Cox PH regression results. Given the time elapsed from the order, buyers are less likely to 
cancel the order when the seller has a quality certificate or a quantity certificate. When the seller has a quick certificate, on the 
other hand, buyers are more likely to cancel the order. Further, the effects of seller certificates on order cancellation are largely 
varying across product types (convenience goods, shopping goods, vs. specialty goods).  
 
We also compared the certificate effects on cancellation between purchase channels (PC vs. Mobile Phone) (Table 3). Since 
buyers who were using the mobile channel for purchases (mobile channel adopters) might be different from buyers who were 
not (mobile channel non-adopters), we first need to address the issue of buyer heterogeneity to tease out the true channel effect. 
In this regard, we stratify the customers into three groups using the Recency, Frequency, and Monetary (RFM) scores and 
compare the results within the stratum. The previous study shows that RFM values are sufficient statistics to summarize 
purchase histories of each buyer, which provides theoretical justification for the use of these measures [4]. Details of our 
analysis results and managerial implications will be discussed during the conference. 
 
Table 1:Descriptive Statistics 
  Order Cancellation  
Average Time to Cancel After Payment 
(hours, std. deviation in parentheses) 
Quick 1 1260557 44581 20.646(.235) 
 0 1271577 70948 49.478(.308) 
OK 1 1769157 63801 29.238(.243)  
 0 762977 51728 49.594(.365) 
Big 1 644432 77298 33.856(.243) 
 0 1887702 38231 47.443(.415) 
Adopter Mobile 92160 3937 39.434(1.074) 
 PC 1073549 52719 37.947(.317) 
 Total 1165709 56656 38.050(.304) 
Non-adopter 1366425 58873 38.643(.301) 
Total  2532134 115529 38.339(.213) 
 
Table 2 :Cox PH Regression Result 
  Product Classification 
Variables Full Model Convenience Goods Shopping Goods Specialty Goods 
Main Variables 
SQ .199*** .064 .229*** .332*** 
SOK -.506*** -.345** -.421*** -.401*** 
SB -.157*** -.119 -.121** -.044 
TP .394*** .637** .301* .434** 
UA .046** -.082 .044 .198** 
Order-specific Control Variables 
OA 8.20e-07*** 2.83e-06** 5.49e-06*** 4.37e-07*** 
OQ -1.701*** -2.366*** -1.225*** -2.070*** 
OSF 1.06e-4 3.10e-04*** 2.26e-04*** 4.16e-05** 
FT 2.275*** 3.377*** 1.632*** 3.234*** 
Individual-specific Control Variables 
Sex .243*** .014 .229*** .074 
BYR .007*** .021** .012*** -.005 
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TOP .046*** .056*** .057*** -.044*** 
Time Interaction Variables (to address the issue of the violation of proportionality) 
SOK*Day1  0.097 -0.200 .185** .319 
SOK*Day2 0.154* 1.005** .005 -.160 
SOK*Day3 .105 -.612 .101 -.162 
SB*Day1  -.185** -.199 -.211** -.482** 
SB*Day2 .087 -.046 .153 .279 
SB*Day3 .179** .686* .180** -.159 
TP*Day1  .011 -.609 .168 .222 
TP*Day2 .063 .403 .077 -.786 
TP*Day3 -.461*** -.493 -.569** -.354 
OA*Day1  -7.88e-09 -1.20e-06 -5.00e-07 2.37e-07 
OA*Day2 -3.49e-07 1.43e-05 -1.24e-06 -1.33e-06** 
OA*Day3 -6.27e-07** 1.26e-05 -1.38e-06 -7.01e-07 
Sex*Day1 -0.45 .021 .095 .409** 
Sex*Day2 .118 -.057 -.003 -.029 
Sex*Day3 -.193** -.054 -.151 .154 
TOP*Day1 -.072*** -.053 -.083*** -.123 
TOP*Day2 .030 -.026 .043 .177 
TOP*Day3 .007 -.015 -.011  -.120 
 
Note:***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1; The dependent variable is the time gap between payment and cancellation, using the hour as 
a unit.There are seven binary variables in our model: whether the seller has a quick certificate (SQ), whether the seller has a 
quality certificate (SOK), whether the seller has a quantity certificate (SB), a dummy indicating the mobile phone transaction 
(TP), whether the user adopted the mobile channel (UA), the user fee type (FT) and sex. Other four continuous control 
variables and one discrete control variable are Order Amount (OA), Order Quantity (OQ), Order Shipping Fee (OSF), the 
inverse form of the time between making the order and finishing payment (TOP) , and Birth year with the reference 1980 
(BYR). Day1, Day2, and Day3 are binary variables which refer to whether the order survived longer than 24 hours, 48 hours 
and 72 hours respectively, to control for the possible time-varying effects. 
 
Table 3 :Cox PH Regression Result of Different Channels 
RFM 3-7 8-10 11-15 
Channel Mobile PC Mobile PC Mobile PC 
SQ 0.0707112 0.1699455*** -0.0450148 0.201431** 0.3405733* 0.2347109*** 
SOK -1.076964*** -0.3474981*** -0.81484*** -0.2215044* -0.3574291 -0.4532154*** 
SB 0.3217223* -0.2606239*** 0.0021598 -0.1569871 0.1768267 0.2136409* 
SOK*Day1  0.3626052 -0.2252062 0.2067386 -0.1628965 0.6601216 0.2781616 
SOK*Day2 0.6354778 0.2063325 0.3280864 0.0999884 0.4652464 -0.3953958 
SOK*Day3 0.2311149 -0.0584457 0.6794119 0.1678273 -1.332679* 0.5330608** 
SB*Day1  -0.8147824*** -0.1531402 -0.1706727 0.0355682 -1.232587** -0.4924972** 
SB*Day2 0.2601718 0.2405205 0.3121466 -0.287222 1.636114* 0.1658501 
SB*Day3 0.0905939 0.269605 0.1070583 0.1759625 -0.4621598 -0.0241504 
 
Note:***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1; RFM refers to the aggregate score of recency, frequency and monetary. The score ranges 
from 3 to 15, representing the most inactive buyers to the most active buyers. Control variables are not shown for expositional 
brevity.  
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